one is faced with an epistemic peer who explicitly believes that not-p. The requirement that the reason for preferring one's own belief be "independent of the disagreement" at issue is meant to include both independence from the belief in question and from the reasoning grounding this belief.
Without this requirement, begging the question would presumably be an appropriate way to respond to a case of peer disagreement-e.g., one could settle a dispute over the question whether p by appealing to p itself. Moreover, since any instance of disagreement will provide one disputant with a reason to believe that the other has failed at some point in her reasoning, parties to a dispute would never qualify as epistemic peers if appealing to the reasoning grounding the belief in question were permissible. I shall call those who hold this view conformists. 10 According to conformists, there cannot be reasonable disagreement among epistemic peers. Thus, Richard Feldman claims that:
…in situations of full disclosure, where there are not evident asymmetries, the parties to the disagreement would be reasonable in suspending judgement about the matter at hand.
There are, in other words, no reasonable disagreements after full disclosure, and thus no mutually recognized reasonable disagreements. (Feldman 2006, p. 235) 11 In a similar spirit, David Christensen says that:
…in [cases of disagreement with epistemic peers], I should change my degree of confidence significantly toward that of my friend (and, similarly, she should change hers toward mine). (Christensen 2007, p. 189) 12 And Adam Elga writes:
When you count an advisor as an epistemic peer, you should give her conclusion the same weight as your own…. call it the "equal weight view". (Elga 2007, p. 478) Suppose that before evaluating a claim, you think that you and your friend are equally likely to evaluate it correctly. When you find out that your friend disagrees with your verdict, how 5 likely should you think it that you are correct? The equal weight view says: 50%. (Elga 2007, p. 488) 13 Conformists, then, argue that equal weight should be given to one's own beliefs and to those held by one's epistemic peers, and thus significant doxastic revision is required in the face of peer disagreement. What kind of doxastic revision is necessary? Answers to this question vary.
Feldman, for instance, casts the debate in terms of an all-or-nothing model of belief, and so he argues that disagreement with an epistemic peer regarding the question whether p requires that both parties to the dispute withhold belief relative to p. Christensen and Elga instead frame the issues in terms of degree of belief, and so they argue that disagreement with an epistemic peer regarding the question whether p requires splitting the difference in the degrees of their respective beliefs. Thus, where 1 represents maximal confidence that p is true and 0 represents maximal confidence that p is false, if I give credence 1 to the proposition that Smith committed the murder and you give credence 0 to the proposition that Smith committed the murder, our attitude towards p should converge in the middle-we should give credence .5 to this proposition and become perfect agnostics with respect to Smith's guilt. But regardless of the details, conformists all agree that when epistemic peers disagree, substantial adjustment is required in their respective beliefs.
Despite the differences between nonconformists and conformists, they appear to share a commitment to a thesis that I shall call Uniformity, 14 which can be characterized as follows:
Uniformity: Disagreement with epistemic peers functions the same epistemically in all circumstances.
According to this thesis, it doesn't matter whether one's beliefs conflict with an epistemic peer's over a confidently held perceptual experience or a dubious political conclusion, a necessary mathematical proof or a supernatural religious doctrine, simple directions to the store or a 
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In addition to evidential and cognitive equality, Richard Feldman adds what he calls full disclosure to the conditions relevant to the disagreement at issue. More precisely:
Full disclosure: A and B are in a situation of full disclosure relative to the question whether p when A and B have knowingly shared with one another all of their relevant evidence and arguments that bear on the question whether p.
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Let us say that when there is both evidential and cognitive equality between A and B in situations of full disclosure with respect to the question whether p, they are epistemic peers.
I shall call disagreement involving epistemic peers in this sense idealized, which can be understood as follows:
Idealized disagreement: A and B disagree in an idealized sense if and only if, relative to the question whether p, (1) A and B are aware that they hold differing doxastic attitudes, (2) prior to recognizing that this is so, A and B take themselves to be epistemic peers with respect to this question, 19 and (3) A and B are epistemic peers.
The "aware that" clause of condition (1) is included to rule out the relevance of the following sort of case: I believe that p and some person in China, who happens to be my epistemic peer relative to this question, believes that not-p, but we are entirely unaware both of each other and of our disagreement. Surely, it is not even clear that such a case properly involves a disagreement, let alone one that should be at the center of this discussion. Similarly, condition (2) is included to preclude the relevance of the following sort of case: I believe the rather complicated mathematical conclusion that p and a 3-year-old, whom I have just met, believes that not-p. While I am aware of our disagreement, I have absolutely no idea that this 3-year-old is a math whiz for her age and thus my epistemic peer regarding this question. Once again, such a case clearly does not represent the sort of disagreement at issue in this debate.
Now, idealized disagreement is to be distinguished from what I shall call ordinary disagreement.
Ordinary disagreement does not require the parties to the dispute to actually satisfy the conditions of evidential equality, cognitive equality, and full disclosure. In particular:
Ordinary disagreement: A and B disagree in an ordinary sense if and only if, relative to the question whether p, (1) A and B are aware that they hold differing doxastic attitudes, and (2) prior to recognizing that this is so, A and B take themselves to be roughly epistemic peers with respect to this question.
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So, whereas idealized disagreement occurs when the parties to the dispute are, as a matter of fact, epistemic peers, ordinary disagreement takes place when such parties at least take themselves to be roughly such peers. 21 There are, then, two different questions that may be at issue: first, can one continue to rationally hold a belief in the face of idealized disagreement and, second, can one continue to rationally hold a belief in the face of ordinary disagreement? Which of these is the focus of the debate between nonconformists and conformists?
Given that the distinction between idealized and ordinary disagreement is not drawn in the literature, combined with the fact that some theorists seem to emphasize the former while others rely on the latter, it is not entirely clear that there is a single answer to this question. For instance, Peter van Inwagen's emphasis on evaluating disagreement in terms of "all objective and external criteria" (van Inwagen 1996, p. 275 ) and Elga's requiring that peers "have the same evidence" (Elga forthcoming, p. 2 of ms.) suggest idealized disagreement, while Feldman's talk of there being no "evident asymmetries" (Feldman 2006, p. 235) it is able to provide a principled explanation for why nonconformism provides the intuitively correct result in some cases, while conformism gives the intuitively correct result in other cases and, second, it is generalizable in a way that neither of these rival views is.
Nonconformism
There are two questions that are at the center of the debate between nonconformists and conformists: (1) does disagreement with an epistemic peer require substantial doxastic revision, and (2) can there be reasonable disagreement between epistemic peers? As we saw above, an answer to the former is taken to dictate an answer to the latter: 23 nonconformists respond negatively to (1) and thus affirmatively to (2), 24 while conformists answer affirmatively to (1) and thus negatively to (2) .
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In this section, I shall begin with (1), focusing primarily on the response nonconformists have given to this question. After doing so, I shall return to a more general consideration of both of these questions.
To my mind, the most promising line of defense for the nonconformist begins with the following type of case:
PERCEPTION: Estelle, Edwin, and I, who have been roommates for the past eight years, were eating lunch together at the dining room table in our apartment. When I asked Edwin to pass the wine to Estelle, he replied, "Estelle isn't here today." Prior to this disagreement, neither Edwin nor I had any reason to think that the other is evidentially or cognitively deficient in any way, and we both sincerely avowed our respective conflicting beliefs. Now, PERCEPTION can be read as involving either idealized disagreement or ordinary disagreement. Let us evaluate these in turn.
If Edwin and I are in an idealized disagreement over the presence of Estelle, then we must be epistemic peers with respect to this question, which requires evidential and cognitive equality in a situation of full disclosure. But it is unclear how to make sense of disagreement occurring in PERCEPTION under these conditions. For recall that two people are evidential equals relative to a question when they are equally familiar with the evidence and arguments that bear on this question. Here is where the ordinary nature of the disagreement is relevant. For notice: even when you and I have had excellent reasons for believing that we are epistemic peers, I will, in ordinary situations, often have access to information about myself that I lack with respect to you-let us call this personal information. Personal information is information that one has about the normal functioning of one's own cognitive faculties. I may, for instance, know about myself that I am not currently suffering from depression, or not experiencing side effects from prescribed medication, or not exhausted, whereas I may not know that all of this is true of you. Of course, given that I have excellent reason for believing that you and I are epistemic peers, I cannot, apart from the disagreement itself, have evidence for believing that you are currently suffering from depression, or that you are experiencing side effects from prescribed medication, and so on. But this is certainly compatible with my not knowing that these things are not true of you. Consider: two oncologists, both of whom are widely regarded as the best in the field, can surely appropriately regard one another as epistemic peers relative to cancer diagnoses, even if they do not at any given time know 15 that the other is not depressed, not overtired, not suffering from a personal crisis, and so on. Now, applying these considerations to DIRECTIONS, note that the very disagreement at issue indicates that at least one of us-i.e., either Jack or I-is seriously cognitively malfunctioning. However, I
know about myself that I have not been drinking, have not suffered from any recent delusions, and do not have any evidence for questioning the reliability of my memory. And while I do not have prior reason to question Jack's capacities, the fact of the disagreement itself, in conjunction with the personal information that I possess about myself, now gives me reason to think that there is a serious problem with his cognitive faculties. In particular, my personal information, when it combines with the already extraordinarily high degree of justified confidence that I have in my belief in DIRECTIONS, is able to serve as the requisite symmetry breaker here. Where Jack had previously seemed to be an epistemic peer of mine, I no longer regard him as one-his epistemic standing has collapsed. This permits me, then, to retain my belief about the restaurant's location with the same high degree of justified confidence I had before the disagreement occurred.
This same point could be cast in the language of defeaters. An instance of ordinary disagreement regarding the question whether p provides me with a defeater for my belief that p.
When I am very highly justified in holding this belief, the personal information that I possess about myself and lack about my interlocutor can provide me with a defeater-defeater for this belief. And, so long as I do not then acquire a defeater-defeater-defeater, I am thereby permitted to rationally retain my belief that p with the same degree of credence.
Perhaps the conformist will here object that the above considerations reveal precisely why it should be idealized disagreement that is at issue. For stipulating that the parties to the disagreement are, in fact, epistemic peers who have fully disclosed their equal evidence effectively rules out the sort of symmetry breaker provided by personal information in cases where there is a high degree of justified confidence, thereby enabling us to focus entirely on the epistemic significance of the disagreement itself. In particular, it can be built directly into evidential and cognitive equality that both parties to the debate know of each other that there are no relevant asymmetries in their respective epistemic situations.
Notice, first, however, that when the case is idealized to this extent, it becomes quite difficult to make sense out of how disagreement is even possible. For if everything even remotely relevant to the topic at hand must be equal, then epistemic peers begin to sound much more like epistemic clones. It then becomes perplexing how epistemic clones relative to a question can even be engaged in a disagreement. Second, even if we were able to render coherent idealized disagreement between epistemic peers in DIRECTIONS, this concept has virtually no connection to the very disagreements that breathe life into this debate. For it is very common for philosophers writing on this topic to motivate interest in it by citing debates in history, philosophy, politics, religion, and other areas where disagreement is widespread and impassioned. But these debates bear very little resemblance to the hyper-idealized scenarios under consideration here. It would rarely, if ever, happen that two people continue to disagree with one another about, say, gay marriage where there is evidential and cognitive equality with known epistemic symmetry in situations of full disclosure.
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Typically, there are all sorts of asymmetries at work, such as in the background assumptions that are being tacitly relied upon-e.g., only one party to the dispute may regard what the Bible says as relevant to social institutions like marriage-or in different character traits-e.g., only one party may be risk-averse-or in different values-e.g., only one party may value tradition more than equality, and so on. Moreover, it is even rarer for the two parties to the debate to know of one another that there are no epistemic asymmetries, particularly when personal information is at issue. How often does it happen, for instance, that I know that my colleague, with whom I disagree about the Iraq war, is not depressed, exhausted, distracted, and so on, on any given day? Thus, conclusions drawn from hyper-idealized situations involving disagreement ultimately tend to have very little connection 17 to the disagreements we face every day. 30 For these reasons, I think that, at least for the most part, ordinary disagreement ought to be the focus of this debate.
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There is another door that is opened for the nonconformist by focusing on ordinary disagreement. Recall that Feldman adds the condition of full disclosure to the kinds of disagreement that are at issue in this debate. But obviously, there are more and less idealized versions of this requirement. At one end of the spectrum, full disclosure requires that epistemic peers knowingly share with one another literally all of the evidence and arguments in their possession that bear in any way on the question under dispute. While no doxastic revision is hard to rationally justify under such hyper-idealized circumstances, it is also difficult to understand how or whether this type of disagreement ever in fact obtains. As Ernest Sosa has emphasized, many of our beliefs are supported by countless pieces of subtle and complex evidence acquired via multiple sources over a number of years. 32 When disagreeing over deeply-entrenched religious and political beliefs or over memorial beliefs from the distant past, for instance, it is often practically impossible to conjure up all of the evidence and arguments that we have that bear on these topics. Once again, then, idealization worries lead to focusing on ordinary disagreement, which requires only that the parties to the debate take themselves to be roughly epistemic peers on the topic at hand. This, however, opens the door to relevant epistemic asymmetries explaining the disagreements at issue. For if there are subtle and complex pieces of evidence that have not been fully disclosed, then some of these very pieces of evidence may explain why the epistemic peers are engaged in the dispute under consideration.
Perhaps underwriting my belief is a phenomenological experience that I cannot adequately convey, or massive amounts of evidence accumulated over many years that I couldn't possibly remember, or data acquired from various sources and contexts that I am unable to articulate. In these types of cases, disclosure would, at best, be only partial. Given that these sorts of epistemic asymmetries may be at work in cases of ordinary disagreement, then, there may be rational reasons for epistemic peers to not engage in doxastic revision.
So, when we focus on ordinary disagreement, it looks as though nonconformists are correct that a negative response to question (1) Now, the first point to notice is that, as we saw with the earlier cases, hyper-idealizing the conditions in BILL CALCULATION renders the disagreement in question rather inexplicable. For instance, if evidential equality is required, it may be argued that I have the experience of going through a calculation that seems to support one-fifth of the bill being $43, and Ramona has the experience of going through a calculation that seems to support one-fifth of the bill being $45, so it is unclear how our evidence could be equal. Perhaps what is meant is merely that we have an equal amount of evidence supporting our different beliefs? But this surely cannot be what evidential equality requires, for there will then be countless cases where peer disagreement is explainable in terms of one party to the dispute being privy to a piece of crucial evidence that the other lacks. Moreover, full disclosure of the disagreement at issue will presumably include our sharing our calculations with one another, at least one of which is incorrect. So, after this full disclosure, what explains how idealized disagreement between epistemic peers persists in such a case?
Given these considerations, BILL CALCULATION, like the earlier cases, seems best understood as involving ordinary disagreement. Thus, apart from the disagreement at hand,
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Ramona and I both take ourselves to be epistemic peers with respect to the question under consideration-that is, we take ourselves to be in roughly a position of both evidential and cognitive equality regarding the amount each of us owes and to have fully disclosed our evidence to one another. 39 What, then, is the rationally appropriate response to our disagreement? Christensen writes, "…it seems quite clear that I should lower my confidence that my share is $43 and raise my confidence that it's $45. In fact, I think (though this is perhaps less obvious) that I should now accord these two hypotheses roughly equal credence" (Christensen 2007, p. 193) . While Christensen argues that Ramona and I should split the difference in the degrees of confidence in our respective beliefs, Feldman's view is that each of us should withhold belief about the amount owed; in both cases, however, the conformist requires substantial doxastic adjustment in the face of ordinary disagreement with peers.
I must admit to sharing the conformist's intuitions in BILL CALCULATION. Given that I argued on the side of nonconformism with respect to PERCEPTION, ELEMENTARY MATH, and DIRECTIONS, but admit that conformism provides the correct result here, I now want to consider whether there is a principled explanation of this difference.
The first point to notice about the two types of cases is the degree of confidence with which the beliefs in question are held. In all of the cases supporting nonconformism, I am extremely confident in the truth of the beliefs that I hold-I am, for instance, extraordinarily sure that Estelle is sitting next to me at the unlikely that this can be explained by appealing to ordinary errors. Second, as noted above, the confidence enjoyed by the beliefs in the cases supporting conformism may not be very high. In BILL CALCULATION, for instance, it is plausible to think that I regard it as quite possible that I am wrong. Third, even if I tend to think very well of my abilities and thereby have an unusually high degree of confidence in my belief, this high degree is surely not justified given the substantial fallibility in this situation. Given these differences, the positive support provided by one's personal information will not be adequate, when combined with the relatively low degree of justified confidence, to render ordinary disagreement with a peer epistemically benign in cases supporting nonconformism.
Consequences
We are now in a position to draw some conclusions about the epistemic significance of disagreement. First, the cases where nonconformism clearly provides the correct result are ones where there is a symmetry breaker between one's epistemic peer and oneself that is provided by the presence of personal information combining with a highly justified confident belief. Second, the cases where conformism clearly provides the correct result are ones where there is a relatively low degree of justified confidence such that the positive support provided by personal information is insufficient for breaking the epistemic symmetry between one and one's epistemic peer. In particular:
Substantial Doxastic Revision Required: In a case of ordinary disagreement between A and B, if A's belief that p enjoys a relatively low degree of justified confidence, then A is rationally required to substantially revise the degree to which she holds her belief that p.
There will, then, be many cases that fall on the spectrum between no doxastic revision required, and substantial doxastic revision being necessary. If, say, A's belief that p enjoys a moderately high degree of justified confidence, then merely some doxastic revision may be required in the face of ordinary disagreement with an epistemic peer. For instance, rather than withholding belief or splitting the difference in degree of belief, A may be required to only somewhat reduce the degree to which she believes that p. On the other hand, if A's belief that p enjoys a moderately low degree of justified confidence, then more doxastic revision may be required in the face of ordinary disagreement, but perhaps still not as much as withholding or splitting the difference in degree of belief. What notion of justification is at work here? While a detailed response to this question lies beyond the scope of this paper, I should say at least a few words about how I am understanding this concept. To this end, let us briefly return to PERCEPTION which, it may be recalled, involves Edwin and me disagreeing over whether Estelle is present at the dining room table in our apartment. Now, let us suppose that Edwin's denial that Estelle is present is the result of hallucinating which, in turn, is caused by the fact that Edwin has been unknowingly drugged by a friend. The drug in question produces no signs discernible to the subject of its effects, and Edwin has no independent reason to doubt his own cognitive capacities. 42 While I am happy to grant that, from a purely subjective point of view, Edwin is just as reasonable in his belief regarding Estelle's presence as I am in mine, I would not agree that our beliefs are even close to being equally justified. In particular, I
am enough of an externalist about justification to require that the process or faculty responsible for the production of the belief in question be reliable or otherwise appropriately truth-conducive. 43 Thus, in the face of disagreement with one another, Edwin and I would both be entitled to hold our conflicting beliefs with the same degree of credence only to the extent that such beliefs are produced by processes that are equally reliable or truth-conducive. 44 Given that one belief is the result of a veridical perceptual experience, and the other the result of a hallucination, my view clearly grants radically different justificatory statuses to them.
It should also be noted that the level of justified confidence operative in the antecedents of the NDRR and the SDRR is determined prior to the disagreement in question, but the disagreement itself can affect whether there is ultimately a relevant symmetry breaker. This point can be illustrated by using the language of defeaters. An instance of peer disagreement regarding the question whether p may be interpreted as providing me with a defeater for my belief that p. of confidence that she has carefully calculated in her head that we each owe $450, which is more than the total cost of the bill.
By way of response to this sort of case, Elga offers the following:
…according to the equal weight view, your probability that you are right should equal your prior probability that you would be right, conditional on what you later learn about the circumstances of the disagreement. And one circumstance of the split-the-check disagreement is that you are extremely confident that your advisor's answer is wrong-much more confident than you are that your answer is right. Indeed, her answer strikes you as obviously insane. So in order to apply the equal weight view, we must determine your prior probability that you would be right, conditional on these circumstances arising.
To do so, think of your state of mind before doing the calculation. We have assumed that, conditional on the two of you disagreeing, you think that your advisor is just as likely as you to be right. But it is also natural to assume that, conditional on the two of you disagreeing and your finding her answer utterly insane, you think that you are much more likely to be right. If so, then when that circumstance arises the equal weight view instructs you to favor your own answer. That is the intuitively correct verdict about the case.
What makes the above answer work is an asymmetry in the case. You find your advisor's answer insane…. (Elga 2007, p. 491) 46 30 So, according to Elga, conformists need not appeal to justification in order to accommodate the intuition that no doxastic revision is required in such a case, for there is a symmetry breaker in EXTREME BILL CALCULATION that can do the work all on its own; namely, that I find Mia's answer utterly insane. Given this, similar remarks could perhaps be extended to cover the counterexamples from Section 1, such as PERCEPTION and DIRECTIONS-I possess a symmetry breaker in both cases because I find the responses offered by Edwin and Jack utterly insane.
There are, however, several problems with this response. First, if the mere fact that one finds the view of one's opponent utterly insane suffices to provide a symmetry breaker in cases of peer disagreement, then not only is the very spirit of the conformist position put in serious jeopardy, but the door is also opened for bias and dogmatism to justify one in rarely engaging in doxastic revision. For isn't it the case that the most impassioned sexists typically find arguments on behalf of women's rights laughable, the most devout racists find the views of proponents of equality crazy, and the most committed homophobes find the idea of granting homosexuals even the most basic dignities perverse. But even putting aside such extreme versions of bias and dogmatism, isn't it quite common for those engaged in deep, impassioned debates to find the views of their opponents completely insane? Opponents of abortion, for instance, frequently argue that the position of prochoice advocates is incomprehensible, those against the war in Iraq are often at a complete loss trying to grasp the view of its supporters, and it is not at all uncommon for critics of Andy Warhol's art to have difficulty understanding the minds of its admirers. Yet given what Elga tells us in the passage quoted above, it looks as though doxastic revision would not be required in such cases since finding the view of one's opponent "utterly insane" provides the necessary symmetry breaker.
Surely, this is a most unwelcome result for an account such as Elga's that pitches itself as an equal weight view.
Once the conformist attempts to avoid this problem, however, it becomes clear that all of the work supporting nonconformist intuitions cannot be done without appealing to the notion of justified confidence, which brings us to the second problem with Elga's response: the possession of symmetry breakers makes sense in the cases under consideration only against the background of beliefs that have a very high degree of justified confidence. To see this, notice that in the cases at issue-PERCEPTION, DIRECTIONS, and EXTREME BILL CALCULATION-the beliefs opposing mine are not, in and of themselves, utterly insane. 47 By itself, it is not utterly insane for
Edwin to believe that Estelle is not at the lunch table with us-this is insane only against the background of my very highly justified belief that Estelle is sitting inches away from us at the lunch table. In and of itself, it is not evidently insane for Jack to believe that My Thai is on State Streetthis is extremely doubtful only when viewed against my very highly justified belief that it is on Michigan Avenue. And viewed in isolation, it is not evidently insane for my friend to believe that we each owe $450 when we are splitting our restaurant bill evenly among five of us-this is insane only against the background of my extremely highly justified belief that the amount owed by each of us when we evenly split the bill must be lower than the total bill. Thus, we can see that the symmetry breakers that Elga claims are doing all of the work are in fact efficacious only when there are highly justified beliefs underwriting them, thereby providing further support for my justificationist account
of disagreement.
Third, as suggested above, even if utter insanity could be understood without smuggling a high degree of justification through the back door, this response on behalf of the conformist would fail to generalize to include all of the problematic cases. For there is nothing about Jack's response in DIRECTIONS that is utterly insane in any reasonable sense. Moreover, it can certainly be stipulated that in all of the relevant cases, both parties to the disagreement find one another's answer equally insane. Given this, there wouldn't even be the possibility of the "utter insanity" symmetry breaker that Elga has in mind, and yet doxastic revision is still not intuitively required on my part in such cases.
Similar considerations apply to Christensen's response (2007) Unlike rival views, then, my justificationist account has the resources to explain why no doxastic revision is required in cases such as PERCEPTION, DIRECTIONS, and EXTREME BILL CALCULATION in both a principled and plausible fashion while appealing to just the original resources of the view.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have defended a justificationist view of the epistemic significance of ordinary disagreement among epistemic peers. Such an account provides a plausible explanation for why nonconformism delivers the intuitively correct result in some cases of peer disagreement while conformism provides the right response in others. These are significant virtues that the present view has over its rivals, as it reveals that my justificationist view is a fully generalizable account of disagreement's epistemic significance that provides principled and unifying explanations of intuitions that would otherwise appear to be in conflict. On more standard usages, an epistemic peer is defined to be an equal with respect to such factors as "intelligence, perspicacity, honesty, thoroughness, and other relevant epistemic virtues" (Gutting 1982, 83) , "familiarity with the evidence and arguments which bear on [the relevant] question", and "general epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from bias" (Kelly 2005) .
In defense of my use, suppose that you think that conditional on the two of you disagreeing about a claim, your friend is more likely than you are to be mistaken. Then however intelligent, perspicacious, honest, thorough, well-informed, and unbiased you may think your friend is, it would seem odd to count her as an epistemic peer with respect to that claim, at least on that occasion. (Elga 2007, p. 499, fn. 21) Now, even if Elga's criticism of the standard use of "epistemic peer" is correct, it would not apply to my characterization in the text since I specify that A and B are both evidential and cognitive equals relative to the question whether p. Thus, according to my use of "epistemic peer," two people could not be evidential and cognitive equals with respect to the question whether p and yet deviate in their likelihood to be mistaken regarding this question.
There are, however, independent reasons to question Elga's nonstandard use of this term. For on his account, two people could radically differ in both their evidential backgrounds and their cognitive abilities with respect to the question whether p, yet nonetheless turn out to be epistemic peers regarding this question.
For instance, I may be a complete novice with respect to identifying birds of prey, and you may be an expert ornithologist. When I am sober and you are highly intoxicated, however, we may be equally likely to be mistaken about whether the bird flying overhead is an osprey. On Elga's account, then, you and I would be epistemic peers with respect to this question, but this strikes me as quite a counterintuitive result.
18 It is unclear whether full disclosure for Feldman includes that A and B both know that all of the evidence relevant to the question whether p has been shared, but I will assume that this is the case at this point. Later in this paper, I will consider the epistemic significance of less idealized forms of disagreement.
19 More precisely, this condition (and the one to follow in my characterization of ordinary disagreement)
should be expressed as follows:
(2*) prior to recognizing that this is so, A and B would take themselves to be epistemic peers with respect to this question, were they presented with the relevant concepts and definitions involved in being such peers.
This version of the condition makes clear that the relevant parties need not literally possess the concepts of evidential equality, cognitive equality, and full disclosure in order to participate in a disagreement; it is sufficient that such parties would regard one another as epistemic peers, were they in possession of these concepts. For ease of expression, however, I shall stick with the less cumbersome formulation found in (2), leaving the reader to interpret it along the lines found in (2*). 20 Otherwise put, A and B disagree in an ordinary sense if and only if, relative to the question whether p, (1) A and B are aware that they hold differing doxastic attitudes, and (2) prior to recognizing that this is so, A and B
are not aware of any relevant epistemic asymmetry between their situations. 21 What about cases where the parties to the debate should take one another to be epistemic peers, but do not?
Such cases may raise all sorts of interesting epistemological questions about egoism, dogmatism, irrationality, and the like. But these issues seem rather independent of the epistemic significance of disagreement itself, and thus lie outside the scope of this paper. WATCH: Sonya and I eat lunch together at a restaurant at noon, take a long walk around the lake, shop at multiple stores, and read at the bookstore café for several hours. I look out the window, noticing that the sun is setting, and say, "It is 7:45 PM, so we should get going," after which Sonya responds, "My watch says it is only 1:15 PM."
It seems clear to me in WATCH that, despite not having a reason independent of the disagreement to prefer the time my watch says over that of Sonya's, I am rational in regarding hers as the inaccurate one. For it is simply not at all plausible to think that we could have eaten lunch, walked around the lake, gone shopping, and read for several hours at the bookstore café in an hour and fifteen minutes, nor is it likely that the sun would be setting in Chicago at 1:15 in the afternoon. Thus, I take it that conformists fail to garner the intuitive mileage that they hope to on behalf of their view from these sorts of non-agential cases.
27 I should mention that Christensen (2007) and Elga (2007) consider a counterexample to conformism that bears some similarities to those found here and attempt to show how their respective views have the resources to rule out doxastic revision in such a case. In Section 3 of this paper, I shall consider their responses in some detail and argue that they fail in various respects.
28 I borrow this phrase from Nathan Christiansen. 34 It should be noted that there are two probabilities that need to be kept distinct: there is (i) the subjective probability that p is true, and (ii) the subjective probability that I am correct in my belief regarding p. Earlier in the paper, the discussion focused on (i), but now I am emphasizing (ii). It should be clear, however, that (i) and (ii) are intimately related for the conformist. For instance, recall David Christensen's claim that, upon discovering that I disagree with an epistemic peer, "(1) I should assess explanations for the disagreement in a way that's independent of my reasoning on the matter under dispute, and (2) to the extent that this sort of assessment provides reason for me to think that the explanation in terms of my own error is as good as that in terms of my friend's error, I should move my belief toward my friend's" (Christensen 2007, p. 199 ). Here
Christensen is saying that in cases of peer disagreement, to the extent that I am willing to assign a 50% probability both to my being correct in my belief regarding p and to my epistemic peer's being correct, I
should split the difference with my epistemic peer in the degree to which I believe that p. Thus, the probabilities assigned with respect to (ii) directly determine the probabilities that should be assigned with respect to (i).
35 I am grateful to Benjamin Almassi for this question. 37 A further defense of conformism frequently found in the literature appeals to the following:
The Uniqueness Thesis: A body of evidence, E, justifies at most one doxastic attitude-i.e., believing, disbelieving, suspending judgment-toward any particular proposition.
Indeed, Kelly (forthcoming) argues that "a commitment to The Equal Weight View carries with it a commitment to The Uniqueness Thesis" (forthcoming, p. 11 of ms.). For proponents of this thesis, see White (2005 ), Feldman (2006 and forthcoming), and Christensen (2007 . While it lies outside the scope of this paper to discuss The Uniqueness Thesis, let me say that none of the arguments I make here depend directly on its truth or falsity.
38 See Christensen (2007, p. 193) . I have slightly modified inessential details of Christensen's case, but all of the elements central to the conclusion about disagreement are the same.
39 I am assuming that Ramona and I each asserting that we have carefully performed the relevant calculations in our heads suffices for us to have reason to believe that full disclosure has taken place. I should say, however, that the condition of full disclosure itself can be fleshed out in more or less idealized ways. For instance, at one end of the spectrum, it may be required that each of us provides all of the details of our respective calculations to one another. In this case, we again face problems making sense of the possibility of the disagreement. For if we have each gone step by step with one another through our fairly elementary calculations, what room is left for us to continue to disagree about the amount owed? At the other end of the 43 spectrum, full disclosure may require nothing more than each of us asserting that we have arrived at the conclusion in question. But then this does not add anything significant to the initial disagreement. Thus, I
think it is best to understand full disclosure as falling somewhere in the middle, which is what I have built into BILL CALCULATION.
40 By a belief enjoying "a very high degree of justified confidence," I mean a very confident belief that is highly justified. 41 In my (forthcoming), I provide a far more detailed defense of my justificationist view that adds crucial further conditions to the above two principles. In particular, I argue that no doxastic revision is necessary if there is either a highly justified target or "protecting" belief, and that substantial doxastic revision is required if there is neither a highly justified target nor "protecting" belief. A's belief that p is protected by A's belief that q if and only if both A's belief that p and A's belief that q are members of a subset of A's beliefs, each of which is challenged by the same instance of ordinary disagreement with B, and where A's belief that q is highly justified and confidently held.
42 I am grateful to Nikolaj Jang Pedersen for raising this sort of question to my account. 43 This reliability condition is certainly compatible with a subjective rationality constraint being necessary for justification as well. For more on this, see my (2008) . 44 Or, at least, roughly equal in terms of reliability or truth-conduciveness. 45 It should be noted that while Christensen (2007) and Elga (2007) 
